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Book Reviews 
THE CONCEPTUAL JURISPRUDENCE OF 
THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION 
A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. By 
Robert Alexy/ trans., Julian Rivers? Oxford University 
Press. 2002. Pp. liii + 462. $110.00. 
William Ewald 3 
This welcome work is a scrupulous translation of Robert 
Alexy's Theorie der Grundrechte,4 a work which first appeared in 
1986 and which has been one of the most influential recent con-
tributions to European thinking about the adjudication of consti-
tutional rights.5 The English version contains a new Postscript 
responding to the various criticisms the work has attracted in the 
past two decades. The theme of the book is the individual rights 
jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court. Of the major 
European legal systems, Germany, with its "higher-law" Consti-
tution, an expansive list of individual constitutional rights, and a 
special court explicitly charged with their enforcement, has been 
at the forefront of the development of a European human rights 
jurisprudence. The European Convention on Human Rights, and 
such national statutes as the British Human Rights Act 1998, 
have begun to spread constitutional rights adjudication through-
out the rest of Europe. The work of the German Constitutional 
Court has provided one of the chief intellectual models, espe-
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cially for the new constitutions of Eastern Europe. For over fifty 
years it has been generating constitutional opinions, often of ex-
ceptional quality, and has in the process developed the richest 
body of constitutional case law outside of the United States; but 
it is a body of case law with close affinities to continental Euro-
pean styles of adjudication. 
It is tempting (and also, with reservations, correct) to de-
scribe the spread of human rights constitutionalism as an expan-
sion of the "American model" of judicial review. Certainly the 
post-war German Constitution was influenced heavily in its con-
ception of judicial review (via Austria) by the American exam-
ple; and the Constitutional Court has paid careful attention over 
the years to the work of the United States Supreme Court. But it 
is worthwhile to recall that the most vigorous period of Ameri-
can human rights adjudication did not begin in earnest until sev-
eral years after the adoption of the German Basic Law, a docu-
ment that already reads like a charter for the activism of the 
Warren Court. In important respects the constitutional devel-
opments in the two countries have run in parallel, in the same 
direction but independently of one another. But more impor-
tantly, as the bibliography and the discussions in this book make 
clear, the intellectual roots of European constitutional rights dis-
course have roots that go back centuries into the western legal 
tradition. The debates are rich and complex, the theoretical con-
structs highly sophisticated; so that what one sees in the wave of 
new human rights courts is not a simple transplanting of Ameri-
can law, but a highly creative borrowing and re-thinking, from 
many sources, of fundamental concepts that lie at the heart of 
the western legal tradition, and of which American law is but 
one outcropping. All of this means that there is an exceptional 
interest for American constitutional scholars in following the de-
velopments in Europe: even when they converge on the same re-
sult, the process of reasoning is often different enough to be 
theoretically illuminating. 
Alexy's work provides a window onto an important corner 
of these intellectual developments. It deals with, and criticizes, a 
wide range of theories in German constitutional scholarship; if 
one reads it with care, one can get an introduction to at least 
some of the modern debates. But an immediate warning is in or-
der. This is an important book, but it is by no means an easy 
book, and the reader must be prepared to work and to think in 
order to get at its meat. There are three reasons for this. First, 
the book was originally written as a Habilitation thesis-that is, 
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as the thesis for the second German doctoral degree (in effect, 
the necessary credential for a tenured professorship). H abilita-
tion theses, especially in law, tend to be long, heavily footnoted, 
and, above all, comprehensive-designed rather to demonstrate 
complete mastery of some doctrinal subject-area than originality. 
Alexy is by disposition and training an analytical legal philoso-
pher, and his work, especially in the core theoretical chapters, is 
far more original than one typically finds in this scholarly genre. 
But he was also constrained to follow the model, and his thesis 
plunges deeply into constitutional doctrine and into the thicket 
of learned commentary. This is a mixed blessing. The discussions 
are informative for a reader trying to get a sense of the field as a 
whole; but often Alexy will spend several paragraphs discussing 
and then demolishing some theory that, objectively, was not 
worth the trouble. Moreover, the primary audience was aca-
demic specialists in German constitutional law. Even in its origi-
nal version it was not a book aimed at a general audience, or 
even at typical law students, but rather at a hard core of experts. 
It therefore takes for granted a knowledge of the principal deci-
sions and of the procedures of the Constitutional Court, as well 
as an extensive knowledge of the background scholarly debates. 
For this reason, one must be prepared to read attentively: it is a 
bit like overhearing one side of a faint conversation where one is 
not always entirely sure what is being discussed. The points of 
reference are subtly different, and one must try to fill in the gaps. 
Fortunately, the core chapters where Alexy sets forth his own 
theory of rules and principles are extremely lucid, and stand on 
their own; but an American reader coming to this subject-matter 
for the first time would find it helpful to begin with a survey ex-
position of German constitutional law-such as the excellent 
treatises by Kommers6 or Currie 7 - before tackling the more 
doctrinal portions of Alexy's book. 
A third difficulty should be mentioned. The translation, by 
Julian Rivers, is exceptionally painstaking; and Rivers himself 
provides an illuminating, lengthy introduction discussing of the 
relevance of Alexy's theory to the British Constitution. Scholarly 
translations of this quality are rare and difficult, requiring as 
they do not only linguistic mastery, but a mastery of the ideas. 
The job must have taken Rivers many months to complete, and 
6. DONALD KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (2nd ed., 1997). 
7. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GERMANY (1994). 
594 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 21:591 
the care he took is evident on every page. But the reader should 
be aware that the translation tends to the literal rather than to 
the elegant. Clearly this was a conscious choice, and one can 
have a high degree of confidence that Alexy's ideas are being ac-
curately rendered. But there is not much music in the prose, and 
often one must be prepared to re-formulate the English in order 
to bring it closer into line with familiar terminology. (Rivers 
gives an example of this process himself on p. xliv of his intro-
duction giving his translation of Alexy's principles of equality, 
and then, three pages later, re-casting them "in more familiar 
language.") One is grateful for the accuracy of the translation, 
but it comes at a price in readability; and, once again, the reader 
will have to expend effort to get the full benefit of Alexy's argu-
ments. 
In other words, this is a challenging and difficult book, 
densely argued and densely written: it is not for beginners, nor 
for the faint of heart. But it is an important book, in many ways a 
brilliant book, and it richly repays close study. The intellectual 
project, the questions raised, the range of reference show a pow-
erful legal mind at work on matters of fundamental importance. 
Alexy's purpose is to provide a systematic theory of the individ-
ual rights provisions of the German Constitution. His concern is 
thus limited to a single national constitution; he explicitly (p. 5) 
disavows any intention here to provide a general theory of con-
stitutional government, let alone a general theory of human 
rights. His work is not intended as a contribution to history, or 
sociology, or political theory, or even legal philosophy-
although it does contain long substantive contributions to legal 
philosophy, and specifically to the theory of norms and princi-
ples. Rather, it is an attempt at a comprehensive, rational recon-
struction of the constitutional law of human rights as it has been 
articulated in the decisions of the German Constitutional Court. 
But this is scarcely a narrow or simple enterprise, and per-
haps the greatest merit of this book is that it makes clear just 
what is involved in such a task, and how difficult it is of comple-
tion. Alexy does not aim at a mere catalogue of constitutional 
case law: his demands on his theory are far more stringent, and 
closely tied to his view of the role of legal scholarship. For if the 
legal order in general, and the law of constitutional rights in par-
ticular, is not to be the arbitrary imposition of rules randomly 
chosen by the judge and backed by the force of the state, then it 
must be possible to give a rational, articulated account of how 
this entire body of law is put together-of its scope, of its proc-
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esses of decision, of the unifying principles that hold it to-
gether-in such a way as to exhibit it as a rational construction, 
deserving of the loyalty of the citizen. That is a tall order; and 
Alexy is here concerned with only one portion of it, namely, the 
enterprise of logical and conceptual analysis-of revealing 
clearly just what this body of law amounts to, and how it is struc-
tured. This is not, for Alexy, the whole of constitutional theory, 
but is its indispensable foundation: "Conceptual and analytical 
clarity is an elementary prerequisite for the rationality of any 
field of knowledge. In practical disciplines, which are only indi-
rectly controlled by empirical experience, this requirement has 
even greater significance" (p. 14). 
It is important to observe that Alexy does not pursue logical 
analysis for its own sake, and that the point of his investigations 
is ultimately a moral one-that the legitimacy of the constitu-
tional order depends on the possibility of just such a rigorous 
and principled account, and that it is above all the duty of legal 
scholarship to provide it: "If there is no clarity in the structure of 
constitutional rights and constitutional rights norms, then there 
will be no clarity in constitutional adjudication, either" (p. 15). 
In particular: 
Without a conceptual-systematic exposition of law, legal 
scholarship is not possible as a rational enterprise. The meas-
ure of rationality of legal jurisprudence depends to a large ex-
tent on the standard it reaches in the analytical dimension .... 
To the extent that the study of constitutional rights can dis-
tance itself at all from political rhetoric and the vacillating 
battle of world-views, this is the work of the analytical dimen-
sion (p. 18). 
In adopting this position, in advocating a turn towards rig-
orous conceptual analysis, Alexy is very much taking sides in the 
long-standing debate between "formalists" and "anti-formalists" 
in German legal theory. Roughly speaking, as in America, the 
modern tendency has been to denigrate the approach of the 
"mere formalists" of the nineteenth century. (This is of course 
no coincidence, since Holmes, Pound, and Llewellyn were all in-
fluenced in particular by the anti-formalist arguments of nine-
teenth-century German legal scholarship, and in particular by 
the works of Rudolf von Jhering.) Alexy consciously takes his 
stand against the anti-formalists, and with the analytical tradition 
represented by Gerber, Windscheid, Jellinek, Laband and Kel-
sen-a tradition which he seeks to marry to the work of modern 
analytical moral philosophers like Rawls, Hart, Hare, Dworkin, 
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and Raz. That such a marriage is now seen as natural and a rich 
mine of jurisprudential ideas is in no small measure a conse-
quence of Alexy's book; but in 1986 it was far from a common-
place. He quotes Wesley Hohfeld repeatedly and with relish on 
the need for conceptual clarity in law, and skillfully deploys an 
arsenal of technical tools (mostly coming from deontic logic) in 
his quest for rigor. He also deploys a dry irony to devastating ef-
fect. After discussing the protests of the anti-formalists against 
Jellinek's theory, he remarks, "These comments, which could be 
increased ... , contain the most important headings of a general 
critique of ... Jellinek's status theory. It goes: formalism, abstrac-
tion, spatialization, isolated individual, obsolete. The counter-
parts are: reality, concrete, mediation, common life/society, cur-
rent" (p. 175). Or again, he remarks: 
The criticism of "spatial thought processes" seems to go fur-
ther than mere formality. According to Rupp, "thinking in 
spatial categories is the enemy of all legal academic attempts 
to conceive of law as a social phenomenon." In the context of 
our discussion of status theory, the idea of a sphere of free-
dom was explicitly included." A sphere of freedom is none 
other than a class of specific liberties. So long as one under-
stands the idea of a sphere of freedom in this sense, it is not 
only harmless, it is indispensable. Relating to classes of ob-
jects is an unavoidable element of thought and speech (p. 
177). 
In a pregnant remark, Alexy describes his work as standing in 
the tradition of "conceptual jurisprudence" (p. 18). The remark 
was no doubt intended to startle (the American equivalent 
would be to claim to be working in the formalist tradition of 
Langdell), but it also provides a useful historical orientation. 
Nineteenth century conceptual jurisprudence was in fact an ex-
tremely rich and sophisticated movement (far more so than 
Langdellian legal science) which systematically re-thought and 
re-organized the conceptual categories of Roman law, and 
thereby provided the intellectual foundation for the German 
Civil Code of 1900. It also, in the process, provided the basis for 
a great deal of subsequent private-law theorizing, not only in 
Germany and Austria, but also in France, Italy, and Latin Amer-
ica. The core accomplishment was the creation of the celebrated 
(and controversial) "General Part" of the Civil Code, in which 
the fundamental concepts of private law, at a high level of ab-
straction, are gathered together and placed in a systematic ar-
rangement. Alexy's work can be viewed as an ambitious attempt 
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to provide German constitutional law with its own "General 
Part"; and it shows just what is required in such an enterprise, 
and how difficult it is to carry through successfully. In the spirit 
of conceptual jurisprudence, Alexy does not attempt directly to 
recount and to analyze the individual decisions of the Constitu-
tional Court, but rather to unpack the basic conceptual appara-
tus that underlies its work. 
The core of Alexy's analysis is found in Chapter Three, 
which is devoted to the structure of constitutional rights norms. 
There he presents the arguments for his core thesis, namely, that 
constitutional rights are principles, and that principles are "op-
timization requirements." His theory in important respects re-
sembles (and was influenced by) Dworkin's theory in Taking 
Rights Seriously.8 Like Dworkin, he takes the distinction be-
tween rules and principles to be fundamental to constitutional 
theory; like Dworkin, he gives principle-based reasoning priority 
over rule-based; unlike Dworkin, his category of "principles" 
embraces collective goals as well as individual rights. It is this 
part of his theory-the theory of principles as optimization re-
quirements-that has given rise to the most discussion and the 
most controversy. Broadly speaking, the criticisms have come 
from two directions. On the one hand, defenders of the tradi-
tional boundary between public law and private law have 
charged that the "optimization requirements" would swallow up 
private law, ultimately turning all of law into constitutional law; 
on the other, defenders of individual rights have charged that the 
"optimization requirements" do not place an adequate deonto-
logical fire wall around individual rights, but instead place them 
on the same footing as collective goals. 
Alexy's response to these criticisms is complex, and is con-
tained in the new Postscript to the English edition. Very roughly, 
his response to the first line of argument is that constitutional 
principles, and in particular the principles of liberty and equality, 
do in fact underlie the whole of the legal order, including the sys-
tem of private law, so that in principle even questions of tort or 
contract can turn into questions of constitutional law, provided 
that they raise the issues of constitutional principle in a suffi-
ciently acute form. However, in the great majority of cases the 
constitutional principles do not themselves dictate any particular 
answer to questions of private law, so that they leave open a 
large field for legislative action. As for the second objection, his 
8. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (rev. ed., 1978). 
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reply (again very roughly) is that his theory allows one to make 
rational judgments about the relative importance of one "opti-
mization requirement" as compared to another, and also to 
evaluate the degree of significance of an interference with the 
requirement; so that, in this way, one can both allow for the 
greater importance of individual rights over certain collective 
goals, but without falling into the sort of ontological absolutism 
that would never permit any balancing of, say, a relatively minor 
infringement of freedom of travel against the interests of na-
tional security. 
This theory of principles lies at the conceptual heart of 
Alexy's theory. Having analyzed norms and rules, principles and 
rights, and having argued for a complex model that will employ 
both rules and principles and provide for a "soft ordering" of the 
basic constitutional principles, he then, in the remaining half of 
the book, proceeds to an analysis of legal status, the limits on in-
dividual rights, and the general rights to liberty and equality. 
These topics are familiar territory for a classical constitutional 
theory based on "defensive" rights against the state. Most of 
German constitutional law fits this classical model; but in the 
closing chapters Alexy considers the status of positive rights 
against the state (in particular, the right to a minimum level of 
social welfare), and also the difficult problem of horizontal or 
third-party effects-that is, the problem of the extent to which 
constitutional law affects the private-law obligations of citizens 
to one another. The discussions are intricate, and the theory of 
principles is the guiding thread throughout these complex discus-
sions; the arguments are pursued with a great deal of acumen 
and of attention to architectonic detail. 
Despite all his respect for logic and intellectual precision, 
Alexy is careful not to claim too much for his theory, and he 
warns both against expecting too much and against expecting too 
little. Those who expect too little include the "decisionists" and 
the out-and-out sceptics who think that no objective ranking of 
constitutional principles is possible, or that abstract theories are 
incapable of offering guidance in concrete cases, or that judicial 
decisions are always more or less irrational. Those who expect 
too much want a legal theory that will provide a single, demon-
strably right answer to every legal question (and, as is well 
known, often the sceptics are just frustrated super-objectivists 
who have lurched from the conclusion that a legal theory cannot 
solve every problem to the despairing conclusion that it can 
2004] BOOK REVIEWS 599 
solve none). Alexy steers a middle course between these ex-
tremes: 
[A] substantive constitutional rights theory which necessarily 
lays down the resolution of every constitutional rights case is 
thus not possible. But this gives us a reason for not expecting 
too much from a substantive constitutional rights theory from 
the very beginning. One can expect no more from it than that 
it rationally structure to the greatest extent possible constitu-
tional rights argumentation in a substantively acceptable way. 
These requirements are satisfied by a principled theory which 
contains a bundle of constitutional rights principles, and 
which places these in a soft ordering by granting prima facie 
precedence to the principles of legal liberty and legal equality 
(p. 386). 
One comes away from this work, not so much persuaded by all 
of the arguments, as impressed by the range of problems, the 
subtlety of the distinctions, the range of scholarship, and espe-
cially by the sheer intellectual difficulty of constructing an archi-
tectonic constitutional theory that will satisfy Alexy's stringent 
demands. 
